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ABSTRACT: Contemporary ethical discourse on animals is influenced partly by
a scientific and partly by an anthropomorphic understanding of them. Appar-
ently, we have deprived ourselves of the possibility of a more profound
acquaintance with them. In this contribution it is claimed that all ethical theories
or statements regarding the moral significance of animals are grounded in an
ontological assessment of the animal’s way of being. In the course of history,
several answers have been put forward to the question of what animals really and
basically are. Three of them (namely the animal as a machine, an organism and
a being that dwells in an – apparently – restricted world) are discussed. It is
argued that the latter (Heideggerian) answer contains a valuable starting point for
an ethical reflection on recent changes in the moral relationship between humans
and animals.
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1. INTRODUCTION
‘Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts
alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can
only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts.’ Those are the words of
the horrible teacher Gradgrind in Dickens’s novel Hard Times who, being
informed that Sissy’s father is a horsebreaker, demands that she give the
definition of a horse. Although Sissy (due to her daily companionship with them)
is intimately acquainted with horses, she is nevertheless startled by the question
and unable to answer it. ‘Girl number twenty unable to define a horse! Girl
number twenty possessed of no facts, in reference to one of the commonest of
animals!’, Gradgrind exclaims, and passes the question over to a boy who
perhaps never so much as touched a horse, but who produces the perfect answer
right away: ‘Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grind-
ers, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in spring... [etc.]’ (1974 p. 5).
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It goes without saying that ‘girl number twenty’, because of her silence, is
Dickens’s heroine. She knows too much about horses, about their way of being-
in-the-world to force her image of them into a factual definition. That is, she
refuses to become a ‘reasoning animal’, someone who defines the world in
objective, factual terms. She seems to realise that such a language will not allow
us to articulate what horses really are. The animal’s way of being is obscured
rather than brought to light by the restricted and impoverished language of facts
and definitions. Rather than allowing us to understand them, it is bound to
estrange us from them.
The comic nature of the scene resides in the fact that Gradgrind demands a
certain speech genre (the objective, scientific language of facts and definitions)
to be automatically applied to any object whatsoever (cf. Bergson, 1940/1969).
Eventually, however, it is the human being, rather than the horse who finds
himself impoverished by this ridiculous procedure. Indeed, in Dickens’s novel,
the definition of the horse is preceded by a definition of man as a ‘reasonable
animal’. In order to be able to perceive the world in factual terms, this is what we
have to become, depriving ourselves of other possibilities of existence. While
defining animals in strictly objective terms, we deprive ourselves of the possi-
bility of a more genuine companionship with them. Gradgrind’s definition of a
horse is as comic as the famous definition of man as a featherless biped, attributed
to Plato and mocked by Diogenes the Cynic, who once plucked a fowl and
brought him into the lecture room with the words, ‘Here is Plato’s man’. As a
result of this joke, ‘having broad nails’ was added to the definition (Diogenes
Laertius 1925/1979, 6:40).
The reason for referring to this comic passage in Dickens’s novel is, that it
points to something which I consider of great importance. The apparent self-
evidence of the scientific (objective, factual) understanding of the world has
decreased our ability to discern what animals really are. Contemporary moral
discourse on animals is influenced partly by a scientific (biological, ethological
or ecological) understanding of them and partly by an anthropomorphic under-
standing of them (treating them as if their way of being-in-the-world is similar
to that of humans). Apparently, we have estranged ourselves from the possibility
of a more profound acquaintance with them, a more profound understanding of
their being. In this contribution, therefore, I will put forward the contention that
a convincing assessment of the moral status of animals can only be achieved if
we refrain from allowing our image of them to be obscured either by a scientific
or by an anthropomorphic stance. In other words, whenever the moral relation-
ship between humans and animals is at stake, the question regarding the is (the
animal’s way of being-in-the-world) must always precede the question regard-
ing the ought (why is it that animals ought to be treated carefully and respect-
fully?). In order to answer the question how animals should be treated by us, we
must become aware of the extent to which contemporary discourse reveals our
actual estrangement from them. All ethical theories or statements regarding the
moral significance of animals are explicitly or implicitly grounded in an
ontological assessment of the animal’s way of being. Many of these assessments
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are in need of thorough reconsideration, or must be regarded as misguided and
pernicious. Most notably, the fundamental difference between the way of being
of animals and humans often tends to be obscured, either by an anthropomorphic
understanding of animals (considering them as persons or partners), or by a
physiomorphic understanding of humans (regarding them merely as a biological
species – an understanding similar to the one mocked by Diogenes – so that our
understanding of the animality of animals (as well as the humanity of humans)
is obscured.
The term ‘animal’ is of course very general and refers to greatly divergent
forms of life, triggering distinctive reflections and responses. Therefore, a
restriction has to be made as to the scope of this article. In this contribution,
whenever I use the term animals, I actually confine myself to mammals, evading
or postponing a moral and/or ontological reflection on other forms of life.
Now, when discussing the moral significance of animals (in the sense of
mammals), most of us will start from the moral conjecture that animal life cannot
be regarded as purely instrumental, as a mere resource ready at hand to be used
and spent in service of human well-being, or as something completely irrelevant
to morality. Animals do seem to have a good of their own, something like
‘intrinsic value’. Yet, as soon as we try to clarify what such notions really mean,
we often seem to be extrapolating anthropomorphic ideas and categories,
developed in the context of an ethical discourse on humans, into the realm of
animal life. In doing so, we allow these concepts to lose their original signifi-
cance, we obscure them and turn them into mere rhetorical phrases rather than
conceptual tools. Again, it is only after we have seriously questioned the is, the
animal’s fundamental way of being-in-the-world, that a satisfactory discourse
concerning the ought – our duties and obligations towards animals – is likely to
emerge.
In the course of history, several answers have been put forward to the
question of what animals really and basically are. In this contribution, I will
discuss three of them, starting with the scholastic-Cartesian understanding of
animals as machines (Part 2). Then I will proceed to Kant’s understanding of
animals as organisms (Part 3), and finally I will discuss the basic differencebetween
animals and humans as articulated by Heidegger (Part 4). All three answers to
the question what animals are contain a moral stance towards them, a moral
assessment of animals. Eventually, I shall opt for a view rather congenial to
Heidegger’s, and I will explore the ethical impact of such a view in terms of the
present debate (Part 5). I will be criticising both an anthropomorphistic under-
standing of animals and a physiologistic understanding of man (cf. Oudemans
1996) and will point to the urgency of a more convincing understanding of the
animality of animals – and, by implication, of the humanity of man.1 Gradgrind’s
definition of a horse implied a certain view of man (man as a reasonable animal),
and also the scholastic-Cartesian understanding of animals as a machine was
intimately connected with a particular understanding of human existence.
Likewise, a more convincing understanding of animals will enhance a more
profound understanding of what we are ourselves.
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2. THE ANIMAL AS A MACHINE
One philosophical answer to the question of what animals really are has been
remarkably influential, namely the idea that an animal is basically identical to a
machine. According to Nietzsche, Descartes was the first who, with a remarkable
audacity, dared to think of animals this way. Ever since, physiologists have been
trying to verify this proposition.2
While dwelling in the Netherlands, Descartes (besides attending anatomical
lessons involving human corpses) was very much engaged in the practice of
dissecting and analysing bodily parts of animals. It is said that he was accus-
tomed to pay daily visits to the slaughterhouses in order to collect interesting
material to be anatomised at home (Lindeboom 1979). The result of his diligence
was the elaboration of an ontology containing the basic contention that animals
(as well as human bodies) are basically machines. They are not like machines in
the sense that the machine merely serves as a metaphor. To Descartes, the animal
really is a machine, and the way of being of an animal is basically similar to that
of a machine, an instrument manufactured by man. This implies that the
phenomena of animal (as well as bodily) life can be understood in strictly
mechanistic terms.
Nietzsche is mistaken, however, in presenting Descartes’ proposition as an
unprecedented modern view. To a considerable extent, Descartes’ ontological
ideas still rely on the very mode of thought he pretended to despise so much –
scholasticism. In fact, the idea that animals are basically similar to human
artefacts, can be encountered in the principal work of the most outstanding
representative of scholasticism – the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas. In
Pars 1a 2ae of this summa, the second article of Quaestio XIII is devoted to the
issue whether animals are endowed with the faculty of free choice, that is:
whether they display resoluteness and goal-oriented behaviour. At first glance,
Thomas argues, this seems to be the case, for it looks as if they intend to realise
certain goals in an conscious and active manner. Moreover, they do seem to have
the ability to choose. A cow, for example, will devour certain kinds of herbs,
while completely avoiding others. At times, moreover, animals are said to
display remarkable signs of sagacity. A dog tracking a deer seems to choose
between different options in a syllogistic, calculating manner. Yet, Thomas
maintains that eventually we must recognise that animal behaviour is completely
determined. They are by nature equipped with a rather limited set of options, and
in a given situation it is rather predictable what they will choose. The facultyof
free choice is denied to them. Although being sensitive, the objects of their
sensitivity are predetermined by nature, rather than purposively and self-
consciously chosen in view of some good. Although they seem to prefer some
things above others (for example some herbs above others), these choices are
predetermined by nature. The movements of animals, Thomas argues, can be
compared to those of arrows. Although one might have the impression that it is
the arrow itself that tries to strike the target, it is of course the archer who is
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responsible for it and who makes the arrow take its course. The movements of
animals are like those of horologia – clockworks – or other artefacts, with the
difference that whereas horologia are human artefacts, manufactured by man,
natural things are divine artefacts. Although animals seem to move on their own
accord, and even seem to display a certain amount of intelligence, their are in fact
pre-ordained to act the way they do. The wisdom and sagacity apparently
displayed by animals themselves, is actually the wisdom and sagacity of Him
who manufactured them and brought them into existence.
From the end of the eighteenth century onwards, philosophy tried to liberate
itself form this mechanistic conception of animals, prepared by scholasticism
and elaborated in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. In the present century,
the mechanistic view was severely criticised by philosophers like Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty, although their contemporary Lacan still endorsed it and even
exaggerated it by considered machines as being more free than animals are
(1978, p. 44). Protagonists of mechanicism like Descartes and La Mettrie, he
argues, were still thinking very much in scholastic terms. What Descartes tried
to discover inside animal and human bodies was the clockwork, the horologia
(p. 93/94). Yet, whereas animals have hardly changed since then, machines have
greatly improved. Therefore, compared to our machines, the animal must be
regarded as a jammed machine, since its parameters are fixed and determined by
its innate equipment as well as by its environment. In terms of freedom and
intelligence, our machines are more similar to human beings than to animals, and
to compare an animal to a machine must nowadays be regarded as a form of
praise rather than degradation.
The view that an animal is basically a machine (referred to as ‘mechanicism’)
will hardly encourage the development of a moral stance towards animals.
Rather, it is an is which silences the ought, an answer to the question of what
animals are which instrumentalises them and subordinates them to human
objectives, disregarding them as objects of moral concern. In order to criticise
such an anthropocentric stance, however, we must first criticise the
instrumentalisation of animals, the ontological understanding in which the
moral assessment is grounded. Therefore, Kant’s complicated effort to under-
stand animal life as an organic rather than as a mechanistic phenomenon must
now be taken into consideration.
3. THE ANIMAL AS AN ORGANISM
Kant’s philosophical point of departure is the distinction between the phenom-
enal realm (the empirical, factual realm of causality, explored by the sciences)
and the noumenal realm (the realm of freedom and reason). Whereas animals
will never enter the noumenal realm (it is a possibility which is fundamentally
denied to them), humans dwell in both. Man is both an empirical phenomenon
(the object of psychology and biology) and a moral subject. This implies that,
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whereas animal behaviour is completely determined by nature (and must be
regarded as consisting of nothing but fixed behavioural patterns triggered by
stimuli from the environment), humans are self-conscious beings who can be
expected to act in accordance with reasonable standards and goals.
With regard to the ontological status of animals, Kant initially seems to take
a mechanistic position, one rather similar to that of Descartes and the scholastic-
mechanistic tradition. Moreover, he clearly states what the instrumentalisation
of animals implies from a moral point of view. Instead of being an end in itself,
he argues, an animal, lacking self-consciousness, must be regarded as a means
which allows us to realise our reasonable ends. Therefore, we do not have any
immediate obligations towards them (Kant 1990). Rather, our duties towards
animals are derivative of our obligations towards man, the true object of our
moral concern.3 We should refrain from cruelty towards animals because it is
likely to enhance cruelty towards humans and because we are really degrading
ourselves by displaying such behaviour. Nevertheless, although cruel in itself,
vivisection in the context of an experiment is admissible because animals must
be regarded as instruments of man.4 And rather than subjecting humans to
medical experiments, we should make use of viler bodies – Fiat experimentum
in corpore vili (1959). Apparently, the moral instrumentalisation of animals
advocated by Kant is closely connected with the ontological one, also supported
by him. Yet, already in his Critique of Judgement, but perhaps even more so in
his Opus Postumum, a different understanding of animals emerges. An animal,
Kant now argues, is not a machine, it is an organism. What does this mean?
Although Kant initially seems to be in agreement with a mechanistic
conception of animal life, he eventually comes to reject it, arguing that animals
are conscious beings, that their behaviour is guided by ‘representations’ of the
environment and that this distinguishes them from mere machines, which act
completely automatically (Naragon, 1990). This forces him, however, to take a
rather complicated and ambiguous position. Naragon summarises Kant’s ambi-
guity regarding animals (or ‘brutes’) in the following manner: ‘Brutes can be
thought of as machines and according to the universal causality of the
phenomenological world they are machines, but they cannot be comprehended
or understood as machines’ (p. 22). This means that, although up to a certain
point animals can be regarded as determined in a mechanical way, this is not the
whole story and the machine-model does not allow us to understand the animal
as an organism. Rather, it leaves us with a reduced and impoverished picture of
animal life. In order for a science of animal life (biology) to be possible, we have
to reflect on what being an organism means. That is, we have to acknowledge the
fundamental difference between organisms and machines, as well as between
biology and physics.
Physics necessarily starts from the supposition that natural phenomena can
be described solely in mechanistic terms, as if the were completely determined
by causality. This does not imply, however, that natural entities really are
machines. In fact, a mechanistic point of view does not allow us to consider the
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apparent purposiveness or goal-orientedness which can be discerned in nature.
In the case of machines, the goal or purpose is external to the thing itself. The
machine itself does not have a goal but is put to use by man in order to realise a
particular objective. In the case of animals, however, we discern a purposiveness
which is already there, intrinsic to the organism itself. In order for a science of
biology to be possible, we must recognise that animal life already seems to be
directed at achieving certain goals. Because of this, we are bound to think of
natural entities as if they are manufactured by a Divine Creator, out of a certain
intention – we perceive them as if they were works of art in the sense of technè.
In short, apart from the mechanical or physical aspect we must also consider
the technical or organic aspect of nature. In the first case, nature functions
automatically, without purpose, and up to a certain point, all things in nature can
be described in this manner (namely as mechanisms with no intrinsic purpose of
their own). Yet, the organic or ‘technical’ aspect of nature must also be taken into
consideration. It can be discerned if the apparent intrinsic purposiveness of
nature – the technica naturalis – is acknowledged. Because of this technica
naturalis, ancient and medieval philosophy concluded that nature really is
manufactured or constituted by a Divine Creator, but according to Kant this
conclusion has become problematic. The apparent purposiveness, he claims, is
not constitutive for nature itself. Rather, it is the way nature is perceived by us.
We are the ones who perceive animals as if the are inherently oriented at realising
certain goals, but we cannot conclude from this that the purpose or intention of
a Divine Creator is behind it all. Should man be absent, nature would be a
wasteland deprived of purpose. Although animals do not act automatically but
are guided by representations, we cannot really say that their behaviour is goal-
oriented in the sense that they are able to develop intentions of their own. For
although animals are conscious beings, only reasonable and self-conscious
beings – that is, human beings – have the capacity to set and realise goal of their
own – reasonable goals. Whereas the apparent goals of animals remain pre-
determined by the laws of nature, only humans allow their goals to be determined
by the laws of freedom (that is, our sense of moral obligation). What does this
imply when it comes to assessing the moral status of animals? Does Kant really
succeed in transcending the scholastic-mechanistic instrumentalisation of them?
Heidegger’s answer to this is that he does not.
4. THE ANIMAL’S WAY OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD
According to Descartes, the animal really is similar to a machine. Kant, as we
have seen, claims that although an animal can be thought of as a machine, the
machine-model does not allow us to acknowledge the organic aspect of animal
life. Initially, Heidegger (1983) seems to side with Kant. Physics, he argues,
presents us with an adequate but reduced picture of the world. Animals are living
beings and physics does not enable us to understand what being a living being
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really means. Yet, Heidegger subsequently points out that Kant’s position
cannot be considered as satisfactory either. For although he acknowledges that
an animal is more than a machine, the kantian understanding of nature remains
thoroughly instrumentalistic. By defining the organic (as opposed to the physi-
cal) aspect of nature as ‘technical’ – technica naturalis – he continues to
understand the natural in terms of the artificial, the living in terms of the
manufactured. Indeed, Kant’s distinction between the ‘mechanism’ and the
‘technique’ of nature is unclear from the outset because the difference between
the natural and the artificial is not thoroughly taken into consideration. Although
Kant, instead of claiming that animals really are divine artefacts, merely claims
that we perceive them as if they are manufactured by a divine agent, he still relies
on the language and logic of a creationist understanding of nature in which the
difference between the natural and the artificial remains obscured.
The animality of animals cannot be brought to light as long as they are
thought of as artefacts (either real or apparent) and this explains why, notwith-
standing Kant’s effort to exceed a merely mechanistic understanding of animals,
the instrumentalisation of them is maintained on a moral level. In order to
develop a more genuine and revealing understanding of what animals are (and,
subsequently, of their moral significance) we have to reflect on their way of
being.
On several occasions, Heidegger reverts to a basic distinction, made by
Aristotle in the second book of his Physics, between the natural and the artificial
(Aristotle 1980, Heidegger 1967). Here, Aristotle contends that, whereas some
things are manufactured by man, others exist (or come into existence) by nature
(1980, 192 b). They have within themselves a principle of movement or change.
All natural things change or grow towards their natural final state or goal, but in
the case of manufactured things, none of them has within itself the principle of
its own making. Rather, it resides in some external agent. Anything that has in
itself such a principle, may be said to possess a nature of its own inherently. From
an Aristotelian point of view, therefore, the idea of a technica naturalis is obscure
because it blurs the basic difference between things that are made (in a technical
manner) and things that emerge by themselves (in a natural manner). Although
Kant stresses that animals are only perceived as works of art, his language
nevertheless continues to rely on the creationist view that had obliterated the
Aristotelian distinction between making and emerging.
Moreover, Heidegger (1983) points out that not only the term technica, but
also the term organism is inappropriate when it comes to acknowledging the
animality of animals because it is derived from organon – which means
instrument or equipment. The animal is neither an artefact nor an instrument, nor
are the animal’s organs instruments put to use by him. Rather, they intrinsically
belong to him, animals generate their own organs, generate themselves, move,
change and recover all by themselves. Heidegger stresses that to live is not a
characteristic of living beings, but rather their basic way of being. Furthermore,
the question regarding the animal’s way of being cannot be posed (let alone
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answered) by biology or any other science, since it is a philosophical one. Most
notably, biology fails to discern the fundamental difference between humans and
animals. This difference does not reside in empirical characteristics, such as
man’s superior intelligence or the absence of fur. Man is not an extremely
intelligent animal, he is not an animal, he is not an entity which, besides being
an animal, somehow ‘has’ the ability to think. The difference between man and
animal resides in their way of being in the world.
What does Heidegger tell us about the animal’s way of being? Whereas a
nonorganic entity – such as a stone, for example – does not have a world at all,
Heidegger (1983) argues that animals do have a world. Yet, they seem to dwell
in a rather poor and restricted one compared to ours. Animals, so it seems, do not
really ex-ist, they do not really stand out towards other things, nor towards other
possibilities of being and relating. A cow, for example, will notice the grass, but
the beauty of the meadow escapes her. The animal hears the sound and tone of
a voice, but does not understand the meaning of the word. He is able to bellow,
neigh or bray, but will never utter something like a language, he will never really
understand or convey meaning (cf. Aristotle 1967, 1253 a 3). Whereas humans
are basically responsive and react out of an understanding of what is perceived
by them, animals are basically impulsive. Moreover, the possibility of truly
becoming involved with things is denied to them – the grass will always remain
grass to them and the prey a prey, it will never become something funny or lovely,
charming or beautiful, let alone pitiful. An object which cannot be somehow
connected with the animal’s vital interests and needs, is not perceived at all and
remains insignificant to him. Moreover, his world will never change. The human
being, however, stands out to and builds his world, uncovering aspects of the
world which to animals remain forever hidden. In order to understand what
animals really are, therefore, we must acknowledge that they are neither divine
artefacts, nor machines, nor human beings. They inhabit a world forever
incomparable with ours. An impoverished world – at least from a human point
of view.
In his book on Nietzsche, Heidegger (1961) puts forward a similar point of
view. The animal does not know what it wants, one cannot even say that it really
wants something (p. 66), for it is merely urged or driven by impulse. To will
something involves an understanding of what is desired. Hunger, for example,
urges the animal to feed himself, but according to Heidegger we cannot say that
the animal has a representation of food as such. His appetites are deprived of
understanding (i.e. the ability to understand something as something). Else-
where, however, Heidegger acknowledges that the animal produces a particular
interpretation of the world, albeit a rather limited one (p. 243). The environment
is interpreted from a certain perspective, namely in terms of possibilities for
absorbing things, in terms of possibilities for life-enhancement. The animal only
perceives what can be absorbed or used in order to enhance life. All things which
cannot be interpreted in such terms, or which do not allow the animal to further
its existence, will simply not be perceived at all.
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In short, whenever Heidegger speaks of animals, his language seems to
convey a sense of restriction, poverty, deficiency and closure. Only humans are
granted the possibility of being susceptible in a genuine sense to what surrounds
them; they build a world, rather than respond to an environment composed of a
rather limited set of objects. Compared to ours, the animal’s world seems
profoundly obscure. They will never experience anything like the sudden uplift
which may at times occur when we are, for example, reading poetry or involved
in an intimate conversation. Although it cannot be excluded that animals dwell
in an openness of their own, we cannot know or say anything about it.
Although elsewhere Heidegger often relies on the possibilities of poetry for
surpassing and leaping beyond seemingly inescapable but unsatisfactory forms
of understanding, Blans (1996) emphasises that this is not the case where animals
are concerned. I fact, in one of his elegies, the Poet Rilke assigns an openness to
animals which surpasses our objectivistic way of perceiving things, and he adds
that, through the mysterious gaze of animals, we ourselves might regain a
susceptibility now lost to us. This possibility for interpreting the animal’s gaze
is bluntly rejected by Heidegger and castigated as being the expression of a
popular and biologistic kind of metaphysics which prefers animal impulse to
human understanding.
According to Oudemans (1996), however, on further reflection Heidegger’s
understanding of animals contains another, less disappointing possibility. To
begin with, he argues, it is not Heidegger’s intention to draw a comparison
between humans and animals. Rather, it is while speaking about ‘world’ that the
animal’s way of being is addressed. Primarily, Heidegger is interested in human
existence. To stand out towards the world means to experience it as something
completely astonishing to us. And it is here that the animal presents itself to us
and reveals its mysterious gaze, which calls for wonderment rather than disdain.
For apparently, they have their own way of standing out towards the world, one
we cannot enter. We cannot really image what their world looks like without
reverting to anthropomorphism, or to a mere biologistic understanding. And this
is our poverty. The possibility of existence open to animals is forever denied to
us. It may well be that animals have their own way of standing out to things, of
becoming involved with things, and perhaps their world merely seems poor
because it is obscure to us, because it is a world into which we will never really
be able to follow them. Due to their mysterious gaze, Oudemans claims, animals
allow us in an unfathomable way to turn away from our own susceptibility to the
world and become, to a limited extent, involved in theirs. Heidegger’s contention
regarding the poverty of animals should therefore not be interpreted in terms of
deprivation, with the implication that our way of standing out towards the world
should be regarded as a standard compared to which all other forms of life must
be regarded as deficient, because we cannot really know what the animal’s world
looks like. To a certain extent we can immerse into their world, but the possibility
of really following them into it is denied to us. The enigmatic aspect of animal
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existence, their unfathomable way of standing out to things calls for wonderment
and awe; and Oudemans refers to a beautiful passage where it is suggested that
the floating, singing and calling of a bird in the summer sky calls us and brings
us into the open (Heidegger 1979, p. 95). Both man and animal stand out to the
world as openness, but each in a way which is inaccessible to the other. I guess
this is what Wittgenstein is pointing at when, in his Philosophical Investigations,
he claims that, should a lion be able to speak to us, we would not be able to
understand him – would not really be able to follow him into his world (1984).5
In short, although Heidegger initially seems to adhere to a rather traditional
understanding of animals in terms of deprivation, lack of understanding and true
involvement, his reflection on the animal’s way of being finally seems to point
to much more promising possibilities. We now have to ask ourselves whether the
basic recognition of the possibility that the animal has his own unfathomable way
of standing out towards the world, enables us to develop a moral relationship
with them.
5. POSSIBILITIES FOR A MORAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANIMALS
Philosophical detours such as the one undertaken in the previous sections are
indispensable if we want our moral assessment of animals to be something more
than an arbitrary statement concerning their moral value – statements we can
adhere to or reject at will, depending on the interest or sentiments we happen to
cherish. In June 1995, for example, a bill on research with animals was put
forward in the Dutch Parliament. One of the amendments passed on that occasion
demanded that the intrinsic value of animals be respected. Such an utterance
must be regarded as highly problematic, for several reasons. Taken in its stronger
sense the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ obscures the extent to which our relation-
ships with humans will always differ from our relationships with animals. It
suggests that we should treat animals in a way comparable to how we treat one
another, that we should refrain from using or expending them in an instrumental
manner and respect them as partners instead. Our actual treatment of animals will
always remain at odds with such a demand. But even in its weaker sense it
presupposes the idea that the world is composed of facts to which human beings
can add something called ‘values’. The animal world is interpreted as basically
similar to our own, and due to the conceptual confusions which arise from this,
we fail to conceptualise the extent to which, during recent decades, and in spite
of the apparent increase of our sensibility when it comes to animals, our actual
exploitation of them has intensified considerably.
Since time immemorial we have been treating animals not as ends-in-
themselves, not as entities of intrinsic value, but in an instrumental way. We
cannot ask them to consent to what is being done to them. They either remain
indifferent, or offer resistance, and we train and domesticate them in order to
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subdue their basic No (although we are never able to silence it completely).
Allow me to elaborate this aspect by means of a quotation borrowed from ancient
tragedy. The basic truth conveyed by the famous chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone
concerning the terrible – deinon – being called man is, that we relate to nature
and animals in a basically violent way (Sophocles 1962). Heidegger (1987)
rightly emphasises that, rather than containing a moralistic critique of human
behaviour, the chorus recognises what we are in a very fundamental way – we
cannot refrain from bullying bulls (or other animals), we cannot do otherwise.
Does Sophocles’ judgement still apply?
Surely it is no coincidence that the current rhetoric about ‘intrinsic value’,
‘animal rights’ and animals as ‘partners’ emerges at a time when animals are
actually being subjected to violent practices such as animal research or genetic
modification on an unprecedented scale and with an unprecedented intensity.
‘Violent’ not in the sense that pain is being inflicted, but in the sense that their
way of being-in-the-world is neglected or violated. The present discourse on
intrinsic value, rights and partnership dates from the period of the Enlightenment
and is borrowed from the moral discourse on man. When applied to animals it
runs the risk of becoming an ideological veil, concealing the true nature of the
profound changes that are actually occurring in our relationship with them.
Rather than respecting them for what they really are, we seem to have lost all
interest in them and all acquaintance with them. While failing to acknowledge
(on a conceptual level) how they differ from us, we are expending them as raw
material for our agricultural and scientific industries on a practical level. And
although apparently the Dutch amendment urges us to regard animals as moral
subjects, it actually is a display of our power to define animals at will, without
having to devote ourselves to a serious effort to get to know them or to articulate
moral categories that might more genuinely respond to what they are (or to the
way we interact with them).
Instead of claiming that, besides being biological entities, to be studied from
a biological perspective, animals are endowed with something like ‘intrinsic
value’, to be studied from an ethical perspective, it is the task of a philosopher
to analyse the profound changes that have actually occurred in our relationship
with animals – changes which can be brought to light if we view them against the
backdrop of the history of our relationship with them. Sophocles emphasises our
ancestors’ abilities to trap and tame animals and to break their resistance.6 That
is, he stresses our negative power over them. In view of this account, the
contemporary discourse on (and actual treatment of) animals indicates that our
power has become positive rather than negative, productive rather than repres-
sive. Indeed, for centuries we have been mistreating, exterminating and disre-
garding them, but quite recently something astonishing has happened: a differ-
ent, unprecedented power relationship has managed to establish itself. Our
ability to mould them, to modify them, to transform them in accordance with our
interests, images and needs has increased dramatically. In the days of Sophocles,
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due to our audacity, intelligence and skill, humans had already acquired a
considerable ability to tone down the animal’s stubbornness, to force the horse
into our halter, the bull under our yoke, the bird into our cage. Indeed, since time
immemorial, our ancestors have been domesticating animal by means of
selective breeding, denying obstinate individuals a chance to reproduce them-
selves. But on entering a university laboratory, or a farm where intensive
breeding is being practiced, we sense that something has changed. Rather than
mistreating the animals, a whole series of efforts is made to secure and monitor
their well-being. Instead of exterminating them and depriving them of their
natural abilities, university laboratories are producing new characteristics at an
astonishingly high pace. Animal welfare has become an intrinsic objective of the
power excercised by us and there seems to be no limit to what we allow these
animals to become. Our power has become productive, rather than repressive.
Rather than restricting them, we are producing new patterns of behaviour.
We must refrain of course from opposing the past to the present in a schematic
manner, for ancient power had its positive aspects as well, and certain forms of
genetic modification, such as the ‘knock down’ experiments to which laboratory
animals are nowadays subjected, can be regarded as ‘negative’ techniques. But
it cannot be denied that animals suddenly seem to have lost what still remained
of their independence, their stubbornness. We are increasingly surrounding
ourselves with artificially produced animals, depriving ourselves of the possibil-
ity of really meeting them, of really being struck by their unfathomable gaze. I
do not demand that this development be nullified or counteracted, for it is not
something we ‘choose’ to do. Rather, it is an event whose basic tendency must
be regarded as inevitable. We can point to its positive and negative, its revealing
and obscuring (or violating) aspects, but this does not mean that we may
pronounce a general moral verdict. Instead of accompanying this development
with a persistent moralistic Jeremiad, the philosopher should rather try to
understand what is happening, to articulate on a conceptual level what has
already occurred in practice.
Moreover, our description of the recent development so far may have been
rather biased in the sense that certain possibilities of relating to animals for which
this development still allows, have been underestimated and neglected. No
doubt, a moral assessment of our relationship with animals must start from our
actual estrangement from them. Besides modifying them, we will continue to use
them against their will, and we will continue to defend ourselves against them.
Moreover, we will do so in an increasingly efficient, scientific and technological
manner. This should not incite us, however, to glorify retrospectively an idyllic
past which has never existed. Rather, it should trigger the awareness that, even
within the technological structures of our present world, other forms of relation-
ship with animals might still be possible. Faced with the traces of their
unfathomable possibility of standing out to the world in a way incompatible with
ours, we might yet (in the folds and margins of our present world) develop a
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moral response of wonderment and awe, might yet be encouraged to seek
genuine forms of companionship, and to enter into a more gentle relationship
with them. By doing so, we will allow them to present themselves to us in a
manner quite different from the way they are represented by the recently
established discourses and practices referred to above. Although Sophocles’
chorus contains a profound truth, it does not contain the whole story, nor does
it exhaust our behavioural possibilities. Basic forms of acquaintance and
companionship with animals, of which Sissy’s relationship with horses might
stand as an example, will allow us to reconsider our own way of standing out
towards the world, will allow the animal to appear in a different light, not as a
resource to be spent in the service of human well-being, but a living being
commanding our astonishment, simply because it is there and we did not
manufacture it.
Tacitus tells us that ancient Germanic tribes kept bands of horses in sacred
forests, where priests observed their neighing and snorting. They were regarded
as confidants of the gods and on no other revelation was more reliance placed.
On special occasions, priests, kings and chiefs of state accompanied them (1958,
p. 279). Apparently, these ancients pagans discerned that the sacred horses were
dwelling in an openness denied to humans, a clearing which somehow surpassed
their own way of standing out. They carefully observed these mysterious beings
who were apparently granted an intimacy with forces transcending the restricted
boundaries of the human world. By observing them and accompanying them on
holy days, they allowed themselves to exceed their restricted way of being,
allowed themselves to shed a glance into possibilities of being with which these
animals seemed to be intimately acquainted.
Many centuries later, Lemuel Gulliver was left behind by pirates on the shore
of an unknown land belonging to the Houyhnhnms, a nobel and generous race of
horses, surpassing human beings in their way of standing out to the world in all
respects. Gulliver’s first encounter with this remarkable species is described as
follows: ‘The horse started a little when he came near me, but soon recovering
himself, looked full in my face with manifest tokens of wonder... I would have
pursued my journey, but he placed himself directly in the way, yet looking with
a very mild aspect, never offering the least violence. We stood gazing at each
other for some time...’ (Swift 1967, p. 270/271). Subsequently, after another
horse has joined them, the two Houyhnhnms start neighing to one another, using
various gestures: ‘not unlike those of a philosopher, when he would attempt to
solve some new and difficult phenomenon’ (p. 272). Swift’s intriguing novel is
a comic echo, a satirical articulation of the basic sense that there is something to
animals like horses which prevents us – both on a conceptual and on a practical
level – from describing their way of being merely in terms of deficiency and lack.
Rather, by reflecting on what they are, we might further our understanding on
what we are ourselves, for the Houyhnhnms’ gaze of wonder conveys the
possibility of a different way of looking at other species that Grandgrind’s
restricted mode of perception.
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Since the days of Lemuel Gulliver, the human world has changed dramati-
cally and irreversibly. In the present situation, virtually all our relationships with
animals are preconditioned by technology, one way or the other. Still, the
possibility of a true companionship with animals, the possibility of gazing at
them in wonderment, will not be completely denied to us. We may still
occasionally meet an animal we did not produce, or introduce, or modify
ourselves, and we may even meet otherness in animals of our own breeding. The
experience of such an encounter, much rather than the disclosure of biological
facts about them, will provide a viable starting point for a moral assessment of
animals.
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1 Foltz also points to the danger that, in our effort to determine the relationship between
human and nonhuman kinds of life, we may overestimate the continuity, either by
regarding human beings as merely one sort of animal among others, or by anthropomor-
phising nonhuman life (1995 p. 131).
2 ‘Was die Tiere betrifft, so hat zuerst Descartes, mit verehrungswürdiger Kühnheit, den
Gedanken gewagt, das Tier als machina zu verstehn: unsre ganze Physiologie bemüht
sich um den Beweis dieses Stazes’ (Nietzsche, 1980, § 14).
3 ‘[W]eil Tiere nu als Mittel da sind, indem sie ihrer selbst nicht bewust sind, der Mensch
aber des Zweck ist, wo ich nicht mehr fragen kann: “Warum ist der Mensch da?”, welches
bei den Tieren geschehen kann, so haben wir gegen die Tiere unmittelbar keine Pflichten,
zondern die Pflichten gegen die Tiere sind indirekt Pflichten gegen die Menschheit’
(1990, p. 256).
4 ‘Wenn also Anatomici lebendige Tiere zu den Experimenten nehmen, so ist es grausam,
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Menschen betrachtet werden, so gehts an...’ (p. 257).
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6 ‘The light-witted birds of the air, the beasts of the weald and the wood
He traps with his woven snare, and the brood of the briny flood.
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Who roams the mountain free, are tamed by his infinite art;
And the shaggy rough-maned steed is broken to bear the bit’
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